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CAFREIGHT CONSOLIDATED PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM CAFREIGHT

CASE OFFICER []

STATION []

for []
Chief, Sino-Soviet Branch

The attached project action is presented for approval.

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32W-6-198/1

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CAFREIGHT CONSOLIDATED PROJECT OUTLINE

CAFREIGHT - Bonn, West Germany - REDTOP operations consolidated project covering six existing access agents and providing for the recruitment of six to ten additional ones. FY 1971. Cost: []

SUMMARY

CAFREIGHT is the cryptonym assigned to Bonn's consolidated REDTOP access agent project and is designed to cover new agent prospects currently under development and existing assets utilized against the local MHARSH target. CATOPHAT is the cryptonym assigned to the MHARSH Embassy located near Bonn, West Germany. CAPAYOFF is the cryptonym assigned to the MHARSH Trade Mission located in Cologne, West Germany. Project CAFREIGHT is directed against CATOPHAT and CAPAYOFF and the personnel assigned to both installations (as well as all other MHARSH potential target personnel operating in MHBURSH with particular reference to the Bonn/Koeln area). Of the 94 persons officially assigned to CATOPHAT, 53 are known or suspect members of MHARSH intelligence. Of the 70 persons officially assigned to CAPAYOFF, 29 are known or suspect members of MHARSH intelligence.

Assets previously provided for under Project CATOPHAT are now included in Project CAFREIGHT, except for HIDRONE, who will be the subject of a separate project.

CAFREIGHT will develop and maintain a stable of controlled assets who can provide assessment and vulnerability information on Bonn's REDTOP targets. It is not designed, in the short term, to produce intelligence information but to provide biographic and assessment data on MHARSH human targets, especially those already selected for intensive coverage. The major product will be operational information concerning the persons and activities of the CATOPHAT and CAPAYOFF installations.

Operational information already collected has suggested the need for additional and new operational approaches,

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provision for which is made in this project. One new approach will be an intensified effort to recruit, train and place secretarial and other administrative and support personnel in positions with selected MHBURUSH business firms having potential for providing them access to the numerous MHARSH representatives known to be maintaining business contacts with them. Other efforts will be made to recruit agents already in, or to be inserted in, cultural, academic and research circles or in any other areas of public or private life known to be frequented by MHARSH target personalities. Obviously, current efforts to identify and recruit new agents from among the existing and known contacts of the various MHARSH officials will continue. Since CAFREIGHT agents will be placed in professional or social situations providing natural access to the target, cover and security will vary with the individual agent.

Finally, although the major thrust of the CAFREIGHT Project remains the MHARSH target, it is also intended to have our CAFREIGHT agents serve as multiple purpose agents, insofar as this is possible. In this context, those CAFREIGHT agents who may eventually be placed in firms dealing with MHARSH and TPFASST will be mindful of requirements not only for information on sensitive trade deals with TPFASST, but also for spotting information on MHBURUSH commercial/technical/scientific personalities who may be dispatched to TPFASST. Moreover, there is a continuing interest in highly sensitive S&T information which may come to the attention of CAFREIGHT agents employed in the more sophisticated aero-space, electronics, and nuclear energy components of MHBURUSH industry insofar as this may net secret information not otherwise available to us that has a bearing on MHBURUSH foreign and defense policy.

PURPOSE

The basic purpose of Project CAFREIGHT is the collection of significant operational and assessment data on selected REDTOP human targets with emphasis on vulnerability data or susceptibility clues which could lead to recruitment or defection of an intelligence source. CAFREIGHT agents will also facilitate, in appropriate cases, direct staff officer access to REDTOP targets for advanced assessment or recruitment purposes. These objectives are listed as Priority A in the current Operating Directive.

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A secondary purpose, as reflected above, is the collection of information in support of Priority A-4 of [] Operating Directive designed to collect information applicable to TPFASST.

DESCRIPTION

Project CAFREIGHT is intended to provide a centrally administered pool of talented, motivated, highly trained, and completely responsive agents of both sexes for intensive utilization in Bonn's REDTOP operational program. Major emphasis is given to operations designed to provide assessment and vulnerability data on MHARSH target personalities and, to a lesser extent, on operations designed to provide access to sensitive information on the TPFASST target. One operational ploy of CAFREIGHT is the recruitment and placement of secretarial and related personnel with no previous intelligence contamination in positions within selected MHBURSH business establishments and firms known to maintain extensive contacts with MHARSH target officials. The positions into which these assets are placed are carefully selected to provide them with maximum exposure to these MHARSH targets. These assets can eventually facilitate access to MHARSH targets for JKLANCE staff officers, when appropriate, for direct assessment or recruitment purposes. Whenever possible, CAFREIGHT agents will be made available for use in other areas for short or long periods in response to specific requests from Headquarters or []

[] Three of the agents previously covered by Project CATOPHAT are included in Project CAFREIGHT, as are three recent agent acquisitions not now covered in any existing project. Our aim is toward the cultivation and assessment of a pool of CAFREIGHT prospects consisting of some twenty or so people. This pool should be constantly fluctuating in size as we recruit a few, reject most, and continue to add new prospects. Because of the money which must be expended in developmental work carried out by several case officers, and in light of the amount for agents' salaries which may have to be paid to get good people, a sufficient sum is budgeted to afford flexibility during the upcoming project year.

BACKGROUND

Intensive recent telephone intercept coverage and surveillance of the MHARSH target has revealed that MHARSH representatives conducting, or pretending to conduct, trade activities with local firms and independent businessmen

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probably offers one of the greatest potential areas of vulnerability to the otherwise formidable wall of security surrounding the local MHHARSH presence. It should be kept in mind that an extremely large number of the MHBRUSH contacts of the MHHARSH human targets in the Bonn area have overriding vested business interests in the MHHARSH officials whom they meet. In many cases, the very existence of the business relationship in question is predicated on the continued good will and confidence of the official with whom the businessman has contact. For that reason, these businessmen usually are not vulnerable to JKLANCE recruitment or they may simply parlay any attempted approach into insurance against any enforcement of COCOM regulations. If these relationships are to be exploited for operational purposes, it is now obvious that an approach less direct than attempting to recruit a trading partner to supply biographic and assessment data on his contact is necessary. These circumstances form the basis for the decision to recruit, train, and direct a cadre of secretarial and other administrative personnel who can obtain positions in these firms or business offices. At JKLANCE direction, these assets can then "piggyback" the relationship which exists between their employers and the MHHARSH official involved under circumstances which will permit them to operate free of the restraining shackles of the aforementioned "vested interest."

In implementing the CAFREIGHT program, [] has succeeded (in the case of CAFREIGHT/1 in collaboration with Munich) in the placement of two such assets to date, CAFREIGHT/1 and CAFREIGHT/2. Other agent assets already on board who are being utilized in various aspects of the CAFREIGHT program are the following: CATOPHAT/1, who has proven his value not only as an LP operator but also as an access channel to AEDICKEY, one of Bonn's primary targets. CATOPHAT/16 has likewise proven himself a useful access informant in the past. He has provided biographic and personality data of value on MHHARSHERS with whom he has dealt. He has provided data of interest on MHHARSH trade relations with numerous local firms and has given good insight into CAPAYOFF, one of the two major MHHARSH installations located in this area. CATOPHAT/22, a new access agent, has been committed in a limited manner to operational activities against the wife of our primary target, AEDUCKBILL, and has demonstrated a willingness to work in an access agent capacity. CACLOCK/16, although a new acquisition of

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the Bonn REDTOP element, has proven his value as an access agent to the Berlin Base and it is intended to exploit him operationally within the framework of this project, probably in a scientific role, by having him find employment in a company dealing with MHHARSH. Such a job could also be beneficial to the AEVIEW effort.

AGENTS AND ASSETS

CAFREIGHT/1 (formerly INORBIT/18) was originally recruited as a safehouse keeper [] At her own volition she returned home to Munich and was recontacted [] case officer as a potential CAFREIGHT candidate. In October 1969 she agreed to participate in the CAFREIGHT Program and is scheduled to begin employment in April, at JKLANCE direction, in a large MHBRUSH firm known to have a large MHHARSH/TPFAST clientele. CAFREIGHT/1 was granted an Operational Approval on 4 December 1968. The OA was updated 26 February 1970 to provide for utilization as an access agent. CAFREIGHT/1 is motivated toward JKLANCE cooperation by financial considerations. She likes WOLADY and its policies and has studied English extensively. Close contact with her current case officers - including a [] case officer who assists [] in this operation - should give her a feeling of belonging and increase her responsiveness in the future. CAFREIGHT/1 has been trained in security and communications and will be trained in observation, reporting and other areas of tradecraft as soon as possible. She has not previously been committed operationally; her security remains good. CAFREIGHT/1 is met at least twice monthly by a [] case officer and less frequently by a [] case officer. Meetings are conducted by pre-arrangement and are held either in public restaurants or a safe house. Both agent and case officer have telephone numbers and mailing addresses for emergency contact.

CAFREIGHT/2 (formerly CACRISP/1), a former CAMP interpreter, was recruited [] for possible use in CAMP operations after she was deported to MHBRUSH (by CAMP authorities) upon partial completion of a jail sentence for attempting to defect while assigned to a Middle East post. The initial lead to CAFREIGHT/2 was supplied by newspaper accounts of her deportation and she was located through the records of the Joint Refugee Operations Center in Berlin (although she never actually processed through Berlin). Following completion of background checks and favorable resolution of possible

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security factors (including an SGSWIRL on 10 February 1968) an Operational Approval was granted on 6 May 1968. As CAFREIGHT/2 never actually resided in West Berlin, administrative and operational control was transferred to the REDTOP unit for her utilization as an access agent. CAFREIGHT/2 is motivated to cooperate with WOLADY intelligence because of her unpleasant experiences as a resident of the communist world, by her desire to help friends still residing in the East, and because of appreciation for financial and moral support which was offered her early upon her arrival in the West. The major control factor lies in her general agreement with WOLADY intelligence objectives. She has been trained in personal and operational security, clandestine communications, observation, and reporting. CAFREIGHT/2 has been employed with a firm whose management personnel are reported to have extensive MHHARSH contacts, including a Bonn primary target, AEDICKEY. CAFREIGHT/2 has been met almost weekly in a safehouse maintained primarily for that purpose. Meetings were generally held by pre-arrangement, although both agent and case officer have telephone numbers and mailing addresses for emergency contact purposes. Unfortunately, CAFREIGHT/2 has been involved in an unhappy love affair with someone residing in the Frankfurt area and she has felt that the only possibility of straightening out her difficulties rests in her returning to Frankfurt. As of mid-April, she has resigned from the above firm and returned to Frankfurt to be used in some other CAFREIGHT capacity in the future, following the birth of her child.

CATOPHAT/1, a former CAWHISPER staff officer, resides next door to AEDICKEY whom he has met and against whom he operates the CAVOICE listening post. He has good potential for improving this relationship. He also performs various investigative tasks on our behalf. CATOPHAT/2 is the wife of CATOPHAT/1 and assists him in his work. An Operational Approval was granted on 2 November 1965. CATOPHAT/1 is motivated to cooperate with JKLANCE partially because of financial considerations since his retirement pay is small. However, as a retired CAWHISPER officer, the intelligence business is in his blood and the work which he does adds a spark of interest and excitement to what would otherwise be a drab retirement existence. Also, he is in agreement with WOLADY political objectives. Other than the inherent dangers existing in CATOPHAT/1's close physical proximity to the target, and his former CAWHISPER employment, there are no known security problems in this case. Because of

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CATOPHAT/22 is a 39 year-old part-time free-lance journalist with good professional contacts and credentials. She is an attractive, well educated, recently widowed woman with one child. Her husband, also a journalist, was under development at the time of his death in April 1969 and the good rapport stemming from this earlier relationship was exploited in her successful recruitment. Provisional operational approval was granted 8 July 1969 for utilization within the framework of Project CATOPHAT as an MHHARSH access agent. An Operational Approval is currently being processed. CATOPHAT/22 is motivated toward JKLANCE cooperation largely on financial grounds, but is also very much interested in the type of work to which she has been assigned. A good rapport with her case officer reinforces her motivations. CATOPHAT/22 has been trained in personal and operational security, limited clandestine communications, and observation and reporting as appropriate for specific assignments. (For instance, she was given observation and reporting instructions on the MHHARSH office she would be visiting in her effort to establish contact with the wife of AEDUCKBILL.) CATOPHAT/22 is met at least three times monthly, usually by pre-arrangement, in a variety of public places and in her apartment. Both case officer and agent have telephone numbers for emergency contacts. Case officer can also contact agent by mail and a bona fides recognition signal has been arranged for emergency introduction of a new case officer.

CACLOCK/16, an MHBURSH national, was recruited by [] when he escaped from East Germany in 1958. He has been active as an agent asset ever since in a wide variety of operational assignments. In September 1969, upon graduation with a PhD in nuclear chemistry, he moved to Munich in order to enhance his professional employment potential. Operational and administrative control was transferred to a [] case officer at that time. He is currently seeking employment which will provide him access of interest to REDTOP targets. He is motivated to JKLANCE cooperation because of early assistance received as a new refugee, general agreement with WOLADY objectives, and long JKLANCE involvement. He has been trained in all aspects of tradecraft, including an intensive TOEXCEL course. His security was improved considerably by his removal from an alias existence in the Berlin leftist community and his move to Munich. He was granted an Operational Approval on 9 September 1964 and last SGSWIRLED on 29 August 1967. A more recent SGSWIRL was waived in late March by Headquarters. He is met at least monthly by a [] case officer, either in

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1. Salaries and operational expenses for agents already recruited:

<u>AGENT</u>	<u>SALARY</u>	<u>OPS EXPENSES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CAFREIGHT/1	[]	\$ []	[]
CAFREIGHT/2	[]	[]	[]
CATOPHAT/1	1,620.00	100.00	1,720.00
CATOPHAT/16	[]	[]	[]
CATOPHAT/22	[]	[]	[]
CACLOCK/16	[]	[]	[]
	[]	\$ []	\$ []

2. Salaries and expenses for agents to be recruited.

Total Project Cost

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